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a b s t r a c t
               
The modiﬁed vaccinia virus Ankara (MVA) strain is a highly attenuated strain of vaccinia virus that has
been demonstrated to be safe for humans. MVA is widely considered as the vaccinia virus strain of choice
for clinical investigation because of its high safety proﬁle. It also represents an excellent candidate for use
as vector system in recombinant vaccine development for gene delivery or vaccination against infectious
diseases or tumours, even in immunocompromised individuals. The use of MVA and recombinant MVA
vectors must comply with various regulatory requirements, particularly relating to the assessment ofeywords:
iosafety
VA-based recombinant vectors
isk assessment
MO-based vaccines
linical trials
potential risks for human health and the environment. The purpose of the present paper is to highlight
some biological characteristics of MVA and MVA-based recombinant vectors and to discuss these from
a biosafety point of view in the context of the European regulatory framework for genetically modiﬁed
organisms with emphasis on the assessment of potential risks associated with environmental release.
© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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. Introduction
The conduct of clinical trials using genetically modiﬁed organ-
sms (GMOs) and/or pathogens and the marketing of medicinal
ubstances containing or consisting of GMOs are governed in the
uropean Union (EU) by a comprehensive regulatory framework
see Table 1). Firstly, as all clinical trials performed in the EU,
linical trials using GMOs and/or pathogens fall under the scope
f Directive 2001/20/EC on the implementation of good clinical
ractice in the conduct of clinical trials on medicinal products
or human use. Secondly, these clinical trials also fall under the
cope of biosafety regulations. In the EU Member States, depend-
ng on the way biosafety Directives were implemented and on the
ype of clinical trial, such clinical trials are regulated by Directive
009/41/EC on the contained use of genetically modiﬁed micro-
rganisms and/or by Directive 2001/18/EC on the deliberate release
nto the environment of genetically modiﬁed organisms. Finally,
he marketing of any medication produced by biotechnology –
ncluding medicinal substances containing or consisting of GMOs –
as to be authorised by the European Commission once an advice
as been given by the European Medicines Agency (EMA). The leg-
slative framework is based on Regulation (EC) No. 726/2004. If a
able 1
U’s  regulatory framework governing the conduct of clinical trials using GMOs and/or p
MOs.
Legislation Main elements
Directive 2001/20/EC This Directive sets out common rules for the
authorisation and regulatory follow-up of a
clinical trial. It aims at protecting human
subjects involved in clinical trials and ensuring
that the results are credible, by establishing
quality, safety and ethical criteria. Approval of
trials is the responsibility of individual EU
Member States, who are required to evaluate
the products used in clinical studies
Directive  2009/41/EC This Directive focuses on the contained use of
genetically modiﬁed micro-organisms
(GMMs),  i.e. any activity involving GMMs  for
which speciﬁc containment measures are used
to  limit their contact with, and to provide a
high level of safety for, the general population
and the environment. The Directive requests
Member States to assess on a case-by-case
basis the risks contained uses may pose and to
implement appropriate containment and other
protective measures to avoid adverse effects
on human health and the environment.
Contained uses are classiﬁed in four classes,
from no or negligible risk to activities of high
risk. The risk classiﬁcation impacts on the
nature of the administrative procedures and
notiﬁcation requirements
Directive  2001/18/EC This Directive deﬁnes the procedure for
granting consent for the deliberate release in
the  environment and placing on the market of
GMOs. It provides for a common methodology
to assess case-by-case the risks for the
environment associated with the release of
GMOs. It also introduces compulsory
monitoring after GMOs have been placed on
the market, as well as compulsory public
consultation and GMO  labelling
Regulation  (EC) No. 726/2004 This Regulation lays down procedures for the
authorisation, supervision and
pharmacovigilance of medicinal products for
human and veterinary use. For medicinal
products derived from biotechnology, it
foresees a compulsory centralised
authorisation procedure in which the
European Medicines Agency is responsible for
drawing up opinions on any matter concerning
the evaluation of the products0 (2012) 2623– 2632
medicinal product contains or consists of GMOs, Regulation No.
726/2004 refers to Directive 2001/18/EC: the applicant should carry
out a case-by-case environmental risk assessment in accordance
with the principles set out in Annex II and on the basis of informa-
tion speciﬁed in Annex III of Directive 2001/18/EC. He should also
provide information on precise instructions and conditions for use
and labelling of the product according to Annex IV. This applies to
GMO  products developed for gene therapy, for therapeutic vacci-
nation or for vaccination against infectious disease.
Several unique features make poxviruses excellent candidates
as efﬁcient vector systems for gene delivery or vaccination: (i) large
packaging capacity for recombinant DNA; (ii) precise recombinant
DNA expression regulated by a strong poxviral promoter; (iii) lack
of persistence or genomic integration in the host due to their cyto-
plasmic replication; (iv) high immunogenicity as vaccine; and (v)
ease of vector and vaccine production [5,6]. However, high inci-
dence of complications observed when administering the poxvirus
Chorioallantois Vaccine Ankara (CVA) as vaccine during the Small-
pox Eradication Programme has generated concerns about the
safety of poxviruses [7].
The  approach taken to address this issue has been the devel-
opment of highly attenuated poxvirus strains, such as the modiﬁed
athogens and the marketing of medicinal substances containing or consisting of
Reference Web link
[1] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001L0020:EN:HTML
[2]  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:125:0075:01:EN:HTML
[3] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001L0018:EN:HTML
[4] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004R0726:EN:HTML
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accinia virus Ankara (MVA) strain. These attenuated strains, in par-
icular MVA  and NYVAC (both derived from vaccinia virus strains)
s well as TROVAC (derived from a fowlpox strain) and ALVAC
derived from a canarypox strain), have been used in the past years
s recombinant vaccines or gene delivery vectors aiming at pre-
enting or treating human and animal diseases. Several animal
accines based on this technology are already registered in Europe.
There is now a large amount of information on biosafety issues
ssociated with the use of MVA  and MVA-based backbone vectors
n the scientiﬁc literature and regulatory dossiers. In this article
e review the main characteristics of MVA  and recombinant MVA
ectors and discuss these characteristics from a biosafety point of
iew.
. Modiﬁed virus Ankara
.1.  MVA  generation
MVA  corresponds to an attenuated laboratory virus developed
y Professor Anton Mayr. It is derived from the Chorioallantois
accine Ankara (CVA) strain of the vaccinia virus. The attenuated
train was renamed MVA  after the 516th passage of CVA strain on
rimary chicken embryo ﬁbroblasts (CEF). Genomic studies have
evealed that, as a consequence of these long-term passages, the
esulting virus lost approximately 15% of its genome compared
o the parental CVA strain [8]. The genome of MVA  is 178 kb in
ength and has been sequenced [9]. Genomic changes occuring in
VA  have been described in several studies [see, e.g. 10–13]. Six
arge genomic deletions have been identiﬁed (three of them located
n the left and right end of the genome) as well as many shorter
eletions, insertions and point mutations, resulting in gene frag-
entation, truncation, or deletions of open reading frames (ORFs).
s a result of these deletions and disruptions, MVA no longer
ncodes many of the known poxviral immune evasion and viru-
ence factors, making the virus defective for replication in human
ells and avirulent in test animals. Genes that are affected by the
enomic changes include host range genes (such as the K1L and
12L/SPI-1 genes, and all ankyrin-like genes but one), genes encod-
ng immunomodulatory proteins (such as the functional receptors
or TNF, IFN-, IFN-/ and CC chemokines, or three of the ﬁve
elch-like proteins) and also genes encoding some structural pro-
eins (such as the major protein of the A-type inclusion body).
utations in viral proteins involved in transcription and replica-
ion as well as in morphogenesis and intracellular transport of virus
articles might also contribute to the in vitro replication restric-
ion of MVA. Different MVA  strains or isolates have been generated,
epending on the passage number in CEF cells. They all originate
rom the strain developed by Professor Mayr and some of them have
een deposited at the European Collection of Animal Cell Cultures
MVA-572: deposit number V94012707; MVA-575: V00120707;
VA-BN®: V00083008) or at the Collection Nationale de Cultures
e Microorganismes, Institut Pasteur (CNCM) (MVA-I721: CNCM
721).
.2. MVA  homogeneity
After  passage 570 on CEF cells, MVA  was considered homoge-
eous and genetically stable, and unable to replicate in mammalian
ells. However, a recent study [14] has shown that some MVA
trains such as the deposited strains MVA-572 and MVA-I721 are
ctually not as homogeneous as previously thought and contain
iral populations or variants able to replicate in some human cell
ine(s) (human keratinocyte cell line HaCat, human embryo kidney
ell line 293, human bone osteosarcoma cell line 143B, and human
ervix adenocarcinoma cell line HeLa) and in immune deﬁcient0 (2012) 2623– 2632 2625
mice.  It was  found that these variants have an altered genotype
compared to the original parental MVA  strain. They are charac-
terised by the presence of loci (site II and/or V) that are deleted
in non-replicating MVA  strains and are associated with mam-
malian host range genes [9] which could explain the increased
ability of these variants to replicate in some lines and enrich from
the parental MVA  strain. Point mutations have also been identi-
ﬁed in some variants isolated from immune suppressed mice but
most of the point mutations identiﬁed affect genes with unknown
function. Only a minority of such variants have been observed,
explaining why  they have not previously been detected by PCR
and nucleotide sequencing alone. In addition, the abovemen-
tioned study revealed that MVA-BN® (Bavarian Nordic’s vaccine
(IMVAMUNE®)) failed to replicate in any of the human cell lines
tested or in immune-suppressed mice, suggesting that MVA-BN®
represents a signiﬁcantly homogeneous MVA  strain.
Most of the MVA  strains are actually polyclonal and contain a
minority of variants that may  differ in their replication proﬁle, and
therefore in their attenuation proﬁle. These variants are similar to
replicating viruses and are able to replicate in generally considered
non-permissive cells for MVA  [15]. This ﬁnding could have a clear
safety impact on the development of MVA  as vaccine or viral vec-
tor. However, it should be noted that even if replicating variants
could lead to the isolation of virulent strains in vitro, this has not
been observed in any preclinical animal testing or in any human
clinical trial undertaken so far [15]. Nevertheless, these ﬁndings
indicate that the homogeneity and replication competence of the
MVA  strain used in a clinical trial should be addressed during the
risk assessment. Since the attenuation of MVA  has been associated
with the acquisition of large genomic deletions together with mul-
tiple shorter genomic changes, DNA extraction from virus-infected
cell cultures followed by PCR analysis and sequencing can be used
to characterise the genotype of the MVA  strain involved. However,
these methods have some limitations for the assessment of com-
plex heterogenic mixtures of viruses potentially containing a small
amount of viral populations with an altered genotype and pheno-
type compared to the original parental MVA  strain. One way to
assess the presence of these MVA  variants is to undertake infection
assays using immune-suppressed mice (incapable of producing
mature B and T cells and highly susceptible to replicating viruses)
in order to recover potential replicating viruses from organs and
tissues of these infected mice, combined with PCR analysis and/or
sequencing to analyse their genome [14].
2.3. MVA host range and expression effects
A series of studies have been undertaken to determine which
cell lines were able to support MVA  replication and propagation.
It has been reported that MVA  growth is restricted to a few cell
lines. Nevertheless, only a limited number of mammalian cell lines
have been evaluated for MVA  multiplication suggesting that it
might be possible that other cell lines than those tested could sup-
port MVA  replication. The known permissive, semi-permissive and
non-permissive cells and the corresponding reference studies are
listed in Table 2. As already mentioned (see Section 2.2 above),
the sensitivity of human cell lines (HeLa and 293) against MVA
differs according to studies. This is explained by the fact that the
MVA strains used in these studies were polyclonal and contained
a minority of variant strains able to replicate in these otherwise
considered non-permissive cells.
It has been shown that cytopathic effects, a common feature
observed upon infection with wild-type vaccinia Virus (and which
include induction of early cell rounding, damage to the host genome
and RNA, inhibition of host protein synthesis, and eventually, death
of the infected cells) are induced only very moderately with MVA
strains [21,22]. Current research also focuses on deciphering
2626 C. Verheust et al. / Vaccine 30 (2012) 2623– 2632
Table  2
Cell  lines susceptibility to MVA.
Cell line References
Altenburger et
al.  [16]
Meyer et al.
[8]
Sutter and
Moss  [17]
Carroll and
Moss  [18]
Drexler et al.
[19]
Blanchard  et al.
[10]
Okeke  et al.
[20]
Chick embryo CEF P P P P
Chick  ﬁbroblast LSCC-H-32 P
Quail embryo QT35 P
Syrian  hamster cell line BHK-21 P  P P
Rat  cell line IEC-6 P
Monkey  kidney ﬁbroblast CV-1 P SP P
Monkey  embryonic kidney MA104 P
African green monkey cell line BSC-1 SP
African  green monkey cell line CV-1 SP
African  green monkey cell line Vero SP SP
Human  cell line A549 SP
Mouse  cell line NMULI SP
Bovine  embryonic lung SP
Human cell line 293 NP NP SP NP
Human  cell line HeLa NP NP NP SP SP
Human  cell line SW 839 NP
Human  cell line Caco-2 NP
Human  cell line FHs74int NP
Human  cell line Hutu-80 NP
Rat  cell line H411E NP
Rhesus  monkey cell line FRhK-4 NP
Chinese  hamster cell line CHO NP NP
Chinese  hamster cell line CHL NP
Pig  cell line PK(15) NP NP
Rabbit  cell line RK13 NP NP NP
Rabbit  cell line RAB-9 NP
Rabbit  cell line SIRC NP
Mouse  DBT NP
Mouse  BALB3t3 NP
Bovine MDBK NP
Equine  dermal NP
Human  ﬁbroblast MRC5 NP NP
Human  HRT 18 NP
Human  Hep-2 NP
Human  melanoma SK 29 MEL  1 NP
Human  embryonic lung LC5 NP
Human  astrocytoma 85 HG 66 NP
Human  glioblastoma U 138 NP
Human  T-cell lymphoma C 8166 NP
T-cell  lymphoma HUT78 NP
B-cell  SY 9287 NP
FS-2  NP
NP: non-permissive; P: permissive; SP: semi-permissive.
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vistinct immune cell responses upon MVA  infection as it may  help
n the design of innovative vaccine strategies. Dendritic cells (DCs)
re important targets of MVA  infection. Upon MVA  infection, DC
orphology, gene expression proﬁles, and maturation state are
odiﬁed [23]. It has been suggested that apoptosis of human DCs
pon MVA  infection may  be responsible for the high immuno-
enicity of MVA  vectored vaccines [24]. Less data is available about
he sensitivity of primary epithelial and muscle cells that are likely
o be some of the ﬁrst cells, along with DCs, that may  be targeted
y the vector after mucosal or intramuscular vaccination.
.4. History of safe use
MVA  was originally developed in the 1970s as a vaccine against
mallpox, a human disease caused by two variola viruses, var-
ola minor and variola major, and responsible for millions of
eaths. MVA-571 (the 571 serial passage strain on CEF cells)
sed as a pre-vaccine followed by conventional smallpox vac-
ination was administered in more than 120,000 individuals in
ermany including high-risk subjects such as patients with ner-
ous system disorder, allergy or skin disease, chronic disease,infants  and children. Contrary to what had been observed with
other vaccinia strains, no serious adverse events were reported
during the vaccination campaign with MVA. Only mild or mod-
erate side effects were associated with the use of this vaccine,
such as local reaction (redness), fever (in ∼2% of vaccinees), “ﬂu-
like” symptoms (in ∼4% of vaccinees) [25–27]. MVA  has since
been evaluated in animal models and in human studies (under
normal or immune-suppression conditions) and was found to
be safe and immunogenic without developing clinical disease
[28].
More recently, the strain MVA-BN® has been developed to gen-
erate a new smallpox vaccine (third generation vaccine). MVA-BN®
is derived from the licensed MVA  used in Germany by additional
passages in CEF cells for extensive plaque puriﬁcation, and was
shown to be a more stable and homogeneous MVA  strain [14].
MVA-BN® and recombinant MVA-BN®-based vectors have been
administered to more than 3400 human subjects [29] including
high-risk populations (e.g. people diagnosed with atopic dermatitis
or infected with HIV) in which replicating vaccines are contraindi-
cated [15]. In addition to extensive preclinical studies in animal
models, the increasing amount of clinical safety data available for
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VA-BN® (Phase I and Phase II clinical studies) strongly suggests
he safety character of this strain [15,30,31].
.5. Site of replication
MVA  is a large complex enveloped virion containing a linear
ouble-stranded DNA genome of 178 kbp. MVA  as well as other
embers of the Poxviridae family are unique among DNA viruses
n that they replicate in the cytoplasmic compartment of the cell
32]. Compared to other DNA viruses, the possibility for integration
f their genetic material into the host chromosome is therefore
xtremely low [33].
.6.  Biodistribution and dissemination
Biodistribution is deﬁned as the dispersion of the vector within
he patient’s body from the site of administration. Knowledge of
he biodistribution of the viral vector is crucial to evaluate the risk
ssociated with dissemination into the environment and possible
ransmission to people in close contact with the patient. Indeed, the
resence of viral vectors in organs might be indicative of potential
hedding through associated excreta. It has been shown that the
ype of the viral vector involved and the administration route inﬂu-
nce the spreading inside the body. It is therefore important that
iodistribution is assessed for each viral vector used.
Only  a few data about MVA  biodistribution could be collected
rom the published literature. One major study addressed the fate
f MVA  vector in BALB/c mice after intraperitoneal inoculation
n comparison with that of the replication-competent Western
eserve (WR) strain using luciferase-expressing viruses [22]. By
easuring the level of luciferase expression in target tissues
spleen, liver, ovaries), it was shown that MVA  is able to reach tar-
et tissues other than the site of administration and retained the
apability to efﬁciently infect the same tissues as the WR strain.
owever, the luciferase activity of the MVA  vector was decreasing
ith time falling to a background value at 48 h post inoculation.
hese results were supported by further studies performed on
mmune-suppressed mice and macaques [34–37]. The observed
ecay of luciferase activity suggesting a rapid viral clearance of MVA
rom the tissues is consistent with the fact that MVA  is an attenu-
ted replication-defective strain unable to produce virus progeny.
Another  study of Ramirez and co-workers reported that
VA biodistribution depends on the route of administration
sed. Intraperitoneal or subcutaneous inoculation of luciferase-
xpressing MVA  resulted in virus spread in almost all tissues
tudied (non-lymphoid tissues, draining and non-draining lymph
odes, spleen) while nasal administration resulted in a more
estricted distribution (nasal associated lymph tissue, lungs and
raining lymph nodes draining the lungs). Vaginal or rectal immu-
isation did not support any viral spread in the analysed organs
38].
.7. Survival in the environment
The  Poxviridae family is a very diversiﬁed family of viruses.
lthough there are considerable differences between viruses, they
hare some major characteristics, such as a high environmental sta-
ility and an extraordinary high resistance to drying enhanced by
he materials in which the virus is released into the environment
dermal crust, serum, blood, other excretions) [39].
.8.  Reconversion to wild typeAs mentioned before, MVA  corresponds to a highly attenuated
train that has lost approximately 15% of the initial vaccinia genome
see Section 2.1). Although the risk of reconversion to wild type can0 (2012) 2623– 2632 2627
be considered as negligible, it has been suggested that some of the
disrupted or deleted genes could be rescued by recombination in
case of co-infection of a MVA-based vaccine and a naturally occur-
ring orthopoxvirus (OPV) [40] (see also Section 3.2 below). Such an
event, however, is considered as extremely rare. Moreover, rever-
tance of MVA  to a replication-competent phenotype is expected to
be highly unlikely because MVA’s replication restriction and atten-
uation is most probably based on a multitude of missing or only
partly functional gene products [13].
3. Recombinant MVA  vectors
In addition to its use as a vaccine against smallpox, MVA  is since
the early nineties considered as a suitable backbone for the devel-
opment of gene therapy recombinant vectors. Since the replication
defect occurs at a late stage of virion assembly the gene expres-
sion remains unimpaired in non-permissive cells making MVA an
efﬁcient expression vector but incapable of causing disseminated
infection in mammals [17]. Actually, MVA  provides a quite high
level of gene expression and has proven to be immunogenic when
carrying heterologous antigens in animals and humans [11].
MVA  is now being used frequently as a viral vector backbone for
the development of recombinant vaccines for infectious diseases
and cancer or gene delivery systems. These studies provide some
good indications on the clinical safety as well as on the clinical efﬁ-
cacy of recombinant MVA  vectors. The ﬁrst study reporting safety
data on immunisation with recombinant MVA  in humans dates
back to 2003 [41]. Moorthy and co-workers reported the safety pro-
ﬁle of a MVA  vaccine against Plasmodium falciparum malaria. Other
studies testing MVA  vaccines for prophylaxis or immunotherapy
against AIDS, tuberculosis, human papilloma virus-associated can-
cer, melanoma and other cancers have since then been completed
and published (Tables 3 and 4). For instance current research
investigates how MVA  interacts with dendritic cells (DCs), what
mechanisms are involved in their maturation of DCs, and how
these cells generate a potent T-cell response to the vector. This is
of importance because MVA  appears an interesting candidate for
the development of vaccines in settings where a T-cell response
is required to control disease. A recent study demonstrated how
dendritic cells exposed to MVA-based HIV-1 vaccine induce highly
functional HIV-1-speciﬁc CD8(+) T-cell responses in HIV-1-infected
individuals [42].
3.1.  Transgene
As  shown in the previous sections, MVA  is a well characterised
viral vector and information concerning the safety of MVA  and
MVA-backbone can be retrieved from numerous preclinical and
clinical studies both in human and in animals. When recombi-
nant MVA-based vectors are used, risk assessment should also
focus on the potential risks associated with the transgene. The
inserted gene(s) and the corresponding sequence(s) should be
clearly described. Transgenes of concern are for example genes that
modulate the immune response or that code for toxins. The poten-
tial effect of the transgene on the biological properties of the MVA
vector should also be considered: the host species, the cell tropism,
the possibility of recombination, the virulence of the virus or its
biodistribution may  actually be modiﬁed. The absence of change in
the biological properties of the vector after insertion of a foreign
gene should be assessed and if necessary, conﬁrmed by in vitro and
in vivo studies.The  stability and integrity of the transgene throughout the man-
ufacturing process is another aspect that should be addressed
during risk assessment. It needs to be demonstrated that the
integrated sequences have not undergone any rearrangements or
2628 C. Verheust et al. / Vaccine 30 (2012) 2623– 2632
Table  3
Clinical studies using recombinant MVA  vector as prophylaxis or therapeutic vaccines against viral, bacterial and parasitic diseases (until 2010).
Target disease Antigen Clinical trial (number of trials) Reference(s)
HIV HIVA (HIV-1 clade A-derived p24/17 gag) Phase I (4) [43–47]
HIV HIVA  (HIV-1 clade A-derived p24/17 gag) Phase I/II (1) [48]
HIV HIV-1-LAI  nef (clade B) Phase I/II (1) [49]
HIV  HIV-1-LAI nef (clade B) Phase II (1) [50]
HIV Env/gag/pol (clade CRF A/E) Phase I (1) [51]
Malaria  ME-TRAP Phase I (5) [41,52–55]
Malaria  ME-TRAP Phase IIa (1) [56]
Malaria  ME-TRAP Phase IIb (1) [57]
Malaria ME-TRAP/CS Phase I (2) [58,59]
Malaria  CS Phase I (1) [60]
Smallpox –  Phase I (1) [31]
Smallpox  – Phase I/Ib (1) [61]
Tuberculosis 85A Phase I (6) [62–67]
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S: circumsporozoite protein; TRAP: thrombosporin related adhesion protein; ME:
utations, or have been lost. MVA, such as all orthopoxviruses,
ncodes its own DNA polymerase which displays a proofreading
unction. The intrinsic mutation rate of poxviruses and therefore
VA, should be similar to that of other replication systems with
roofreading DNA polymerases. Nevertheless, it has been shown
hat the stability and integrity of the transgene can be affected by
everal factors. For instance, the formation of spontaneous muta-
ions in recombinant MVA  depends on the insertion site of the
ransgene. In that respect, it has been suggested that recombinant
VA stability could be increased by avoiding transgene insertion
t MVA  del II site or other sites between non-essential genes, or
y eliminating long homonucleotides runs by silent codon alter-
tion to reduce the risk of frameshift mutations [81]. It has also
een shown that the stability of the transgene may  vary according
o the characteristics of the transgene [81], the MVA isolate itself
82] or the cell lines used for viral vector multiplication [83]. In
he latter case it was shown that a gene encoding inﬂuenza virus
aemagglutinin inserted into a MVA  vector was stable after several
assages on African Green Monkey derived Vero cells but unstable
n rat derived IEC-6 cells.
The  genetic stability of each recombinant vector should there-
ore be conﬁrmed by several passages (number that covers the
assage from the Master Seed Virus to the Production Batch) at
 low multiplicity of infection in CEF cells and hybridisation with a
NA probe speciﬁc for the inserted gene.
.2. Recombination
Orthopoxviruses (OPVs) are widely distributed in the ecosys-
em, and since recombination among OPVs has been reported to
ccur at high frequencies [84,85], naturally occurring OPVs may
ctually represent a pool of viruses available for putative recombi-
ation with recombinant MVA  vectors during co-infections. Indeed,
able 4
linical studies using recombinant MVA  vectors for prevention and treatment of cancer (
Target disease Antigen 
Cervical cancer Transcriptional activator HPV E2 
Cervical  cancer Transcriptional activator HPV E2 
Melanoma  Human tyrosinase 
Melanoma  Tyrosinase 
Melanoma  7 Melanoma tumour antigen cytotoxic T lymph
Breast  cancer MUC1 
Breast  cancer Oncogenic growth factor receptor HER-2 
Colorectal  cancer Tumour antigen 5T4 
Colorectal  cancer Tumour antigen 5T4 
Prostate  cancer MUC1/IL2 
Lung  cancer MUC1/IL2 
Renal  cell carcinoma Tumour antigen 5T4 Phase I/IIa (1) [68]
ple epitope.
it  has been shown that poxvirus recombination, which is inextri-
cably connected to replication, only requires 12 kb end sequence
homology [86]. Since replication is only blocked at a late stage
in non-permissive hosts, even the highly attenuated MVA  could
undergo homologous recombination in non-permissive hosts co-
infected with other OPVs [83]. Most speciﬁcally, post exposure
therapies of MVA  to treat pre-existing OPV infection in animals [87]
correspond to situations where the risk of co-infection between
vaccine strains and naturally circulating relatives may exist [83].
In a recent publication, recombination ability was  addressed by
co-infecting BHK-21 cells with a MVA  vectored inﬂuenza A vaccine
and a Norwegian cowpox isolate (CPXV). Vero cells that are permis-
sive only for CPXV and not for MVA  were used to select CPXV hybrid
viruses expressing the Inﬂuenza haemagglutinin (HA) gene [83]. It
was shown that MVA  and CPXV undergo recombination in vitro,
establishing new CPXV hybrids expressing the HA gene initially
present on MVA. The experimental conditions were set up to iso-
late only CPXV-HA hybrids suggesting that other recombination
events did certainly happen but were not reported.
The possibility of recombination should therefore be evaluated
for each recombinant vector in the context of its use, by tak-
ing into account the susceptibility of the target species to other
OPVs as well as any epidemiological data concerning the presence
or the absence of OPVs in the area where the vector is planned
to be administered. For example, during the development of the
vaccinia-rabies glycoprotein recombinant virus for vaccination of
red fox, the susceptibility of red fox to cowpox virus was investi-
gated and serological studies were undertaken to investigate the
presence of circulating orthopoxviruses in the target population
[88].
In situations where a possibility of recombination exists, for
example when natural OPVs are expected to be present in the main
target cells, the potential consequences of recombination and the
until 2010).
Clinical trial Reference
Phase I/II [69]
Phase II [70]
Phase I/II [71]
Phase I [72]
ocyte (CTL) epitopes Phase I [73]
Phase I [74]
Phase I [75]
Phase I/II [76]
Phase II [77]
Phase II [78]
Phase II [79]
Phase II [80]
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esulting associated risk should be assessed on a case-by-case basis
aking into account the characteristics of the recombinant vec-
or (the transgene, especially) and of the naturally occurring OPVs
nvolved. Recombination could result in a modiﬁed recombinant
ector containing previously deleted genes (and therefore recov-
ring replicative properties) or, alternatively, in the transfer of the
ransgene into replication competent OPVs. Additional in vitro or
n vivo studies could be designed to investigate the genetic and bio-
ogical properties of the potential recombining progeny viruses. It
ust be noted that the probability of recombination between MVA-
ased vectors and other OPVs is expected to be higher in the case
f wildlife or domestic animal vaccination since animals represent
 wide reservoir for natural OPVs.
. Considerations for risk assessment and risk management
.1. Risk classiﬁcation
Microbiological agents are categorised into four Risk Groups
Risk Groups 1–4) according to their impact on human health and
he environment. Several factors such as the severity of the dis-
ase caused, the transmissibility and the availability of effective
reatment or vaccine are taken into account to assign an agent to
 speciﬁc Risk Group. Biological agents that are unlikely to cause
isease are classiﬁed into Risk Group 1 while agents responsible
or severe diseases with a high potential of transmissibility and for
hich no treatment is available are assigned to Risk Group 4.
According  to its high attenuation proﬁle and its history of safe
se, MVA  is generally classiﬁed in Risk Group 1. However, this
lassiﬁcation is only valid if the MVA  strain is genetically stable,
omogenised and is characterised by (i) a high degree of attenu-
tion in mammalian cells; (ii) a host-range restriction (inefﬁcient
ropagation in mammalian cells: no viral particles are produced);
nd (iii) a cytoplasmic localisation (no genome integration). The
resence of the six deletions in the genome of MVA  responsible
or its high attenuation and host-restriction can be conﬁrmed by
olymerase chain reaction using speciﬁc primers.
In case of a recombinant MVA  vector, the risk classiﬁcation
hould also take into account the potential risk associated with
he transgene product. Speciﬁc classes of genes including cytokine
oding genes and virulence genes are inherently associated with a
igher risk (see also [89]). For instance the vaccinia virus gene K1L,
hich is naturally deleted in MVA  but has been used as a marker for
election and isolation of recombinant MVA, extends the host range
o rabbit kidney cells [90] and encodes viral functions that impair
mportant anti-viral defence mechanisms of the infected host [91].
.2. Environmental risk assessment
Shedding corresponds to the dissemination of a viral vector in
ny form into the environment via excreta (urine, faeces, sweat,
aliva, nasopharyngeal ﬂuids), blood and semen from the treated
atient [92]. It is a major concern in the environmental risk assess-
ent since shedding determines the likelihood of exposure of the
ecombinant vector to contact persons (third parties: untreated
ersons/animals) and to the environment. Shedding analysis gener-
lly consists of the detection in excreta of vector sequences by PCR
sing vector-speciﬁc primers and/or detection of infectious viral
articles by biological assays (in vitro culture of shed material) [93].
There is currently limited information available from the lit-
rature concerning vector shedding in general. Shedding studies
re indeed rarely reported in publications on clinical trials. Data
oncerning shedding associated with MVA-based vectors should
herefore be collected and discussed primarily in the context of the
nvironmental risk assessment of regulatory dossiers.0 (2012) 2623– 2632 2629
To be sufﬁciently representative, shedding studies should be
designed (determination of the sample collection, sampling fre-
quencies and study duration) by taking into account the dose, the
route of administration but also the characteristics of the vector
[92]. The capacity of replication is, for example, an important factor
to consider. Attenuated replication-deﬁcient vectors do not per-
sist for a long period of time in tissues, suggesting that shedding
should be of short duration. Biodistribution studies revealed that
MVA  does not persist more than 48 h inside the body [6,34]. In
one study reporting the results of a Phase I immunotherapy with
a MVA  expressing human MUC1, urine samples collected 4 h post-
injection and on day 8 appeared to be negative for the presence of
vector sequences [74]. The sampling should therefore focus on the
ﬁrst few hours following administration and a last control should
be performed a few days after administration.
Spreading occurring at the site of administration is another con-
cern in the environmental risk assessment. Especially when the
product is administered subcutaneously, viral particles are often
found on the skin close to the site of administration. This issue
can easily be addressed by cleaning any residual vectors present at
the site of injection after each administration [36,76]. To this end,
upon injection, the injection site is disinfected using 70% alcohol,
isopropanol swabs or other suitable disinfecting agent and cov-
ered with a wound dressing to capture any leakage of GMO  shortly
after the injection. After a standard medical follow-up of the sub-
ject during 4 h the wound dressing is removed and replaced by a
new disposable dressing before the subject is released from the
hospital setting. The original wound dressing is collected together
with any other material and/or objects that have been in contact
with the GMO  material and are destroyed as hazardous medical
waste. The second wound dressing can be removed and discarded
as normal household waste. The inoculation of MVA  vaccine via the
intramuscular route also eliminates the development of skin pock
lesion, reducing the shedding via those lesions [15].
It  is important to point out that shedding/spreading of the
recombinant vector and the resulting dissemination into the
environment is not an adverse event per se. Signiﬁcant shed-
ding/spreading will result in greater environmental exposure but
its impact will mostly depend on the characteristics of the recom-
binant vector itself, i.e. its capacity to replicate, its survival in the
environment, its transmissibility and also the safety proﬁle of the
transgene. The shedding/spreading of vectors such as MVA  (as long
as no potentially harmful transgene is inserted) which are unable
to produce new viral progeny and to propagate in most mammalian
cells should only lead to limited environmental impact.
4.3.  Containment and worker protection measures
When MVA  or MVA-based recombinant vectors are used under
contained conditions (laboratories, hospital rooms, animal husban-
dries, production facilities), appropriate containment and other
measures to protect human health and the environment shall be
implemented as a result of a risk assessment taking into account in
particular the characteristics of the microbiological agent manipu-
lated and the nature of the activity. Four basic containment levels
are deﬁned in the European legislation (level 1 to level 4, with level
4 being the most stringent) describing the required practices, safety
equipment and design criteria of the facilities. The extreme atten-
uation and the history of safe use of MVA  allow handling this virus
under containment level 1 in the clinical setting. A containment
level 2 should nevertheless be recommended for the manufac-
turing/production of MVA-based vectors in order to implement
adequate precaution measures (physical containment devices and
personal protective equipment).
When  recombinant MVA  vectors are used, the containment
level will depend also on the nature of the transgene as it
2 ccine 30 (2012) 2623– 2632
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Table 5
Biosafety aspects associated with the use of MVA  and MVA-based vectors.
Biosafety issues Recommendations
MVA  homogeneity Potential presence of
variants (minor
population) able to
replicate  in
mammalian cell lines
The homogeneity of the
MVA  strain should be
evaluated  during the risk
assessment,  by performing
when  necessary in vitro or
in vivo infection studies
(such  as infection of
human  cell lines or
immune-deﬁcient mice
with  MVA strains) in
addition  to traditional PCR
and sequencing methods
Transgene  Transgene may present
hazardous  properties
or  change the vector
properties
Risk assessment should
take  into account the
characteristics  of the
transgene  (nature,
stability,  condition of
expression), the
construction/production
process  and the
characteristics of the ﬁnal
recombinant  vector
(absence/presence of new
properties  compared to the
MVA-backbone) and
possible  or known side
effects related to the
expression  of the transgene
Recombination Establishment of new
vector  with novel
genetic  and biological
properties  (genes that
are  interrupted or
deleted  in MVA could
be  rescued during
recombination;
transgene  could be
Epidemiological data
concerning  the occurrence
of  natural OPVs in the area
of  administration should
be  analysed to consider the
necessity for in vitro or
in  vivo co-infection studies
(between  the recombinant
vector  and the potential630 C. Verheust et al. / Va
ight ultimately inﬂuence the level of risk associated with the
ecombinant vector (see Section 4.1).
.4. Laboratory-acquired infections
No laboratory-acquired infections resulting from exposure to
VA strains or to recombinant vectors derived from these strains
ave been reported in the scientiﬁc literature or to the US Centers
or Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
.5. Waste treatment
Compared to other enveloped virions, poxviruses have a low
ontent of lipids in their envelope: they are therefore less sensitive
o organic solvents. Nevertheless, they stay quite susceptible to a
ariety of chemical disinfectants, such as formaldehyde, glutaralde-
yde, ethanol, isopropanol and peracetic acid (PAA) [94]. It has been
hown that MVA  presents the same disinfection susceptibility pro-
le as the infectious vaccinia Lister Elstree strain [94,95]. In addition
o chemical disinfection, steam sterilisation remains very effective
o inactivate these viruses [39].
It is recommended that liquid and solid waste (potentially)
nfected by MVA  as well as disposable materials are inactivated
efore removal in accordance with the regulation in force. Since
tudies have revealed the presence of residual vectors at the injec-
ion sites [36,76], these sites should systematically be cleaned after
dministration to reduce all risk of vector dissemination.
. Conclusions
Initially developed in response to the need for a safer vaccine
gainst Variola in the 1970s, MVA  is now widely used as recombi-
ant vector for vaccination against various pathogens or as delivery
ehicle for gene therapy. Indeed, MVA  presents several advan-
ages. It is an attenuated virus that has undergone several deletions
ncluding deletion of some mammalian host range genes, which
ave signiﬁcantly reduced its virulence and pathogenesis in both
ealthy and immuno-compromised humans and animals. MVA  is
ot able to propagate in human and in most mammalian cells thus
educing the risk associated with its potential dissemination. In
ddition, the MVA  genome cannot interact with the genome of the
nfected cells since it remains localised in the cytoplasm which lim-
ts the risk of integration. Since 1970, various MVA-based vectors
ave been administered to thousands of individuals without any
ajor side effects reported.
Although  these advantages make MVA  vectors potentially safer
hen compared to other vaccinia strains, we have presented in
his document several issues which should be considered care-
ully when performing the risk assessment of MVA  and MVA-based
ectors. These biosafety issues and suggested related recommen-
ations are summarised in Table 5.
As shown in Table 5, risk assessment of MVA-based vectors
hould consider the intrinsic characteristics of the MVA  strain
in particular its homogeneity), the characteristics of the trans-
ene (and its potential impact on the properties of the whole
ecombinant vector) and the possibility of recombination with nat-
ral orthopoxviruses. This information is essential to evaluate the
otential risk for people manipulating the MVA  product or the risk
ssociated with transmission to third parties and dissemination
nto the environment after shedding or spreading of the viral vec-
or. In that respect, it is recognised that although MVA  disseminates
uickly into the organism after administration, shedding should be
imited to the ﬁrst hours following administration because the dis-
emination in the body is followed by rapid viral clearance of the
ector due to its replication-deﬁcient property. In addition, the risktransferred  to
replication  competent
orthopoxviruses)
natural  OPVs)
of dissemination of potential shed material can be considered negli-
gible since MVA  corresponds to a highly attenuated vector unable to
propagate in most mammalian cells. Nevertheless, it is important to
consider that to date there is a lack of available information on MVA
shedding in the literature. Therefore, abovementioned information
is critical in guiding, on a case-by-case basis, the design of shedding
studies in support to the risk assessment of MVA-based vectors.
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